Selected publications

 

Here you can find selected publications of our team.

  • Kittsteiner, T.; Ott, M.; Steinberg, R. (2021): Competing Combinatorial Auctions. In: Information Systems Research (forthcoming). https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2021.1018.
  • Chen, R.; Chen, Y.; Riyanto, Y. E. (2021): Best practices in replication: a case study of common information in coordination games. In: Experimental Economics 24 (1), S. 2–30. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-020-09658-8.
  • Crosetto, P.; Filippin, A.; Katuščák, P.; Smith, J. (2020): Central tendency bias in belief elicitation. In: Journal of Economic Psychology 78, S. 102273. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2020.102273.
  • Casas-Arce, P.; Kittsteiner, T.; Martínez-Jerez, F. A. (2019): Contracting with Opportunistic Partners: Theory and Application to Technology Development and Innovation. In: Management Science 65 (2), S. 842–858. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2967.
  • Gürerk, Ö.; Bönsch, A.; Kittsteiner, T.; Staffeldt, A. (2019): Virtual humans as co-workers: A novel methodology to study peer effects. In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 78, S. 17–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2018.11.003.
  • Feldman, N. E.; Katuščák, P.; Kawano, L. (2016): Taxpayer Confusion: Evidence from the Child Tax Credit. In: American Economic Review 106 (3), S. 807–835. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20131189.
  • Ferreira, D.; Kittsteiner, T. (2016): When Does Competition Foster Commitment? In: Management Science 62 (11), S. 3199–3212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2295.
  • Katuščák, P.; Michelucci, F.; Zajíček, M. (2015): Does feedback really matter in one-shot first-price auctions? In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 119, S. 139–152. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.08.002.
  • Kittsteiner, T.; Ockenfels, A.; Trhal, N. (2012): Partnership dissolution mechanisms in the laboratory. In: Economics Letters 117 (2), S. 394–396. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.084.
  • Frutos, M-A.; Kittsteiner, T. (2008): Efficient partnership dissolution under buy-sell clauses. In: The RAND Journal of Economics 39 (1), S. 184–198. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25046369.
  • Kittsteiner, T.; Ockenfels, A. (2008): On the Design of Simple Multi-unit Online Auctions. In: Henner Gimpel (Hg.): Negotiation, auctions, and market engineering. International seminar, Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, November 12-17, 2006, rev. selected papers, Bd. 2. 1. Ed. Berlin: Springer (Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, 2), S. 68–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77554-6_5.
  • Kittsteiner, T.; Eyster, E. (2007): Party platforms in electoral competition with heterogeneous constituencies. In: Theoretical Economics 2, S. 41–70. https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/150091.
  • Kittsteiner, T.; Ockenfels, A. (2006): Market Design: A Selective Review. In: Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft 5.
  • Kittsteiner, T.; Moldovanu, B. (2005): Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines That Depend on Processing Time. In: Management Science 51 (2), S. 236–248. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0301.
  • Kittsteiner, T.; Nikutta, J.; Winter, E. (2004): Declining valuations in sequential auctions. In: Int J Game Theory 33 (1), S. 89–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820400186.
  • Fieseler, K.; Kittsteiner, T.; Moldovanu, B. (2003): Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade. In: Journal of Economic Theory 113 (2), S. 223–234. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00109-1.
  • Kittsteiner, T. (2003): Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations. In: Games and Economic Behavior 44 (1), S. 54–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00021-6.